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The distillation, distribution and use of illicit alcohol have historically been widely accepted in 
many rural communities. A conflict has long existed between this community acceptance and the 
law. As a result, agents attempting to enforce alcohol violations pertaining to moonshine have 
historically been frustrated by their inability to gather posses, find witnesses and win convictions 
in court. This article uses data collected from qualitative interviews to examine how this social 
acceptance of illegal behavior has contributed to this frustration and demonstrates how cultural 
conflict explains why prosecutors decline to prosecute defendants for criminal offenses, an act 
commonly referred to in legal circles as nolle prosequi decisions, as well as examples of jury 
nullification. 











The practices of jury nullification and nolle prosequi, whereby a prosecutor refuses to file 
criminal charges for a possible crime, are controversial and can contribute to public 
disillusionment toward the criminal justice system. However, they may also provide justice in 
the view of some communities, particularly when the community members believe law 
enforcement practices, or the law itself is unjust. These events provide a glimpse of Sellin’s 
(1938) argument that some crimes are manifestations of cultural conflict between localized 
expressions of norms and values and those of the dominant culture and the imposition of laws 
through the state. This appears to be particularly true in rural areas where folk crimes are 
accepted by community members regardless of how the law views them (Forsyth and Marckese 
1993; Wilson1983; Bertrand and Baird 1975). 	  
This article presents research from qualitative interviews with participants involved in the 
industry of illicit alcohol, commonly referred to as moonshine or white lightning. The sample 
includes producers (referred to as moonshiners), consumers, and traffickers (referred to as 
bootleggers), as well as retired alcohol law enforcement officers.  The interviews reveal evidence 
of jury nullification and nolle prosequi in rural areas of the United States in regards to crimes 
involving moonshine. It is proposed here that public acceptance of moonshine production, use 
and trafficking makes illicit alcohol offenses involving moonshine a folk crime according to the 
definition that Forsyth and Marckese (1993) use. This definition notes social acceptance in rural 
areas of some behaviors that are illegal. For the current research, this acceptance is manifested 
through jury nullifications and prosecutor refusals to file charges. The qualitative data provides 
evidence of both of these legal phenomena. These moonshine related offenses appear to 
demonstrate how rural American culture conflicts with alcohol restrictions imposed by state and 
federal governments, thereby providing an example of Sellin’s (1938) “Cultural Conflict” 
explanation of crime.  His article also provides an explanation and overview of the concept of 
folk crime and explains how the data support these concepts by asserting that jury nullification 
and nolle prosequi practices reflect folk crime and that these practices are examples of Sellin’s 
Cultural Conflict explanation.   
Review of the Literature 
This article links the illegal behavior associated with moonshining with criminological 
theory issues of culture conflict theory and folk crimes as well as criminal justice system issues.   
Therefore, the literature for the pertinent issues is covered here, beginning with a discussion of 
the scant research on moonshining. 
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 Literature on Moonshine 
 The field of criminology has overlooked the deviance surrounding the illegal production, 
trafficking and use of illicit alcohol. Literature on this subject is typically in the form of books 
that are not centered on criminological issues.  For example, Miller’s (1991) analysis of 
moonshine markets in southern states during the post-bellum era is primarily an historical 
review. Other historical reviews with a cultural special interest emphasis are provided by Greer 
(2004), Carr (1971), and Wigginton (1971). Watman (2010) presents a log of modern attempts to 
distill moonshine along with historical insights into the practice of moonshining.   
 Academic articles on moonshining reflect a wide-range of disciplines from fields other than 
criminology.  Academic research on moonshining practices has been published in the areas of 
Appalachian cultural research (Peine and Schaft 2012), history (Guthrie Jr. 1994; Rayburn 
1957), archeology (Douglas2001) and marginally in economics (Spellman and Jorgenson 1982).  
While all these sources refer openly to the illegal nature of illicit alcohol production, trafficking 
and use, none of them come from the field of criminology. Like many rural crime issues, 
criminologists have simply not explored this area of research. This article sets out to address this 
shortcoming by noting the connection between this form of deviance and a criminological theory 
known as culture conflict and specific criminal justice issues, specifically jury nullification and 
nolle prosequi decisions. 
 Literature on Culture Conflict Theory 
Thorsten Sellin (1938) presented the culture conflict explanation of crime. This theory 
states that groups, especially subcultural groups, place expected behaviors, called conduct norms, 
on its group members. Members of these subcultures are indoctrinated into the accepted 
behaviors through socialization.  Under certain circumstances, these subcultural conduct norms 
violate the formal controls of their dominant cultures. He states, “[I]t is necessary to think of 
culture conflict as a conflict of conduct norms, that such conflict may arise as a result of a 
process of group differentiation within a cultural system or area, or as a result of contact between 
norms drawn from different cultural systems or areas…” (Sellin1938, p. 98). 
Sellin’s (1938) primary example of this theory focused on immigrant groups that had been 
entering the United States in the decades preceding and simultaneous to his writing. As these 
groups brought the accepted norms of their immigrant subcultures into the existing American 
culture and followed those conduct norms, they sometimes found themselves in violation of U.S. 
laws. This was defined as primary cultural conflict whereby the conduct norms of a new, 
subordinate group conflict with the existing, dominant group. However, it is important to note 
that these were not the only conditions of culture conflict that Sellin addressed. He also proposed 
cultural clashes between rural and urban conduct norms. This was propositioned to be a growing 
concern as America urbanized.  This secondary culture conflict occurs when, “[S]egments within 
the same culture differ as to the acceptability of conduct norms. In other words, one social group 





defines something as deviant or criminal, yet others in the same culture consider this behavior 
normal and noncriminal” (Lanier, Henry and Anastasia, 2015, p. 196). It is this secondary culture 
conflict that is most relevant to the current discussion. The distinctions between rural and urban 
cultures highlight the explanations for why illicit alcohol production is accepted in some rural 
communities yet prohibited by the dominant culture’s law.   
Einat and Herzog (2011) propose that culture conflict can be seen in terms of perceptions 
of seriousness of criminal offenses. In their sample, different subcultures rated the seriousness of 
offenses differently. The current study follows the same rationale in asserting that some rural 
subcultures view moonshine offenses as less serious than the dominant cultural view that makes 
it illegal. Hence, because making, drinking and trafficking moonshine is accepted by a rural 
community while the dominant culture prohibits it through law, it serves as an example of 
conflicting norms. The community acceptance would therefore make involvement in the 
moonshine trade a folk crime, as explained below. This should manifest itself in the criminal 
justice system through cases of jury nullification or prosecutor refusals to prosecute out of 
concern for disrupting the typically accepted behavior of a rural community.    
This study proposes that juries from moonshine-accepting communities will demonstrate 
their acceptance of the behavior by failing to convict offenders despite the strength of the 
evidence in their cases. It also proposes that prosecutors in moonshine-accepting communities 
will refuse to prosecute some moonshine cases.  This may be due to either a belief that a 
conviction is unlikely, or a concern that reelection chances are diminished by prosecuting a case 
for a socially accepted behavior. Regardless, both results derive from community acceptance of 
the behavior. 
Folk Crime Literature 
The concept of folk crime refers to acts that meet the legal definition of illegal acts but are 
accepted by the community where the acts occur and are therefore treated with indifference.  
Wilson (1983, p. 123) defines folk crime as, “offenses that do not impair the public identity of 
offenders as respectable, law-abiding citizens.”  Ross (1960-1961) provides an example in traffic 
offenses and asserts that folk crime offenses are not stigmatized in society because they are 
considered less severe than other offenses. This is augmented by the fact that many offenses do 
not require the intent element and are mala prohibita offenses, that is, actions made illegal as a 
result of legislative action or governmental regulations but are not considered wrong in and of 
themselves. Thus, they are not viewed as nefarious when they are stand-alone offenses.  
However, this is not to imply that all folk crimes are minor offenses in terms of the law’s 
definition of the behavior, only that social mores may be accepting of the behavior regardless of 
the legal view of it.  Furthermore, some of this may be the result of new laws infringing on 
previously established standards of conduct. New laws often have a “lack of basis…in traditional 
morality” (Ross, 1973, p. 80). 
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Folk crime has been recognized by researchers for a number of acts and appears to be 
particularly relevant to some rural-specific offenses. When societies become more complex as a 
result of expanded industrialization, traditional rural values often conflict with new value 
systems that expand into rural areas. Therefore, previously accepted behaviors may become 
illegal, but rural residents will still subscribe to the previously held beliefs.  As Forsyth and 
Marckese (1993, p. 27) state, “They are oriented toward the past, remain(ing) isolated pockets of 
traditionalism and are in conflict with the codes of the larger culture.” Therefore, some rural 
offenses appear to serve as examples of folk crimes.   
Researchers have noted a number of offenses that have been classified as folk crimes.     
Ross (1960-1961, 1973) explains folk crime in the context of motor traffic violations in the mid-
twentieth century as driving skills were new and developing rapidly. Indeed, even modern 
violators of minor traffic laws do not lose social status in their communities as a result of their 
offenses. Bertrand and Baird (1975) note that burning forests was once accepted as a means of 
clearing timber from a stretch of land and therefore accepted by rural communities. However, 
this type of burning was criminalized in the twentieth century, yet rural community views did not 
simultaneously change, so burning woods was not condemned in many rural communities even 
after the behavior had been outlawed. Wilson (1983) found that law enforcers actually made 
accommodations for shell fishermen who violated the law through their interpretation of the law 
and the offenses because local communities were tolerant of the violations. Forsyth and 
Marckese (1993) sampled poachers in Louisiana and concluded that folk crime explanations are 
relevant to their behavior because of the social acceptance in the rural areas where poaching 
occurs.  In further research on game violations, Forsyth (2008) further explains illegal hunting as 
a form of folk crime. 
Gibbons (1972) notes the quantity of non-serious offenses in rural areas including a high 
number of alcohol related offenses. He also describes many rural offenses similarly to folk 
crimes, but he dismisses the associational nature of the offenses. This is a departure from the 
majority of folk crime discussions. Folk crimes do not result in the loss of social status for 
offenders, but the social acceptance of the community is still related to the nature of associations 
in the rural setting. This is an important note in that social relationships with offenders and 
acceptance of their behaviors seems to contribute to jury nullification. 
Jury Nullification Research 
Jury nullification is somewhat unique to the American criminal justice system. Horowtiz, 
Kerr, Park and Gockel (2006, p. 163) define it as “[T]he power of jurors to return verdicts that 
are counter to both the law and the evidence.” When a jury exercises this unofficial power, it 
renders a not guilty verdict despite solid evidence pointing to a defendant’s guilt. This has the 
effect of negating a law for that particular case. Jurors have this ability because they are not 
required to provide explanations for their decisions and jury deliberations are kept confidential.  
The reason for a jury acquittal may be for completely legitimate reasons, such as a lack of belief 





in the defendant’s guilt. However, nullification is often the result of a community’s 
unwillingness to convict one of its members for an offense because there is either no public 
support for the law that is being enforced or the way it was enforced, or incredulousness toward 
law enforcement officers who may not be from the community. Ullman (205, p. 1097) states, 
“[T]he secretive nature of deliberations allows jury members to acquit for any number of non-
evidentiary reasons, such as sympathy for the defendant or personal displeasure with the law 
under which the defendant is charged.”    
Because jury nullification is not an official verdict, some interpretation and judgment is 
required to determine whether it has occurred when an acquittal is presented. With that caveat, 
there is reason to believe that jury nullification is not widespread (Hannaford-Agor and Hans 
2003) but some cases seem to draw its use most frequently. Scholars have noted its use in cases 
involving three strikes laws, mandatory sentences, assisted suicide, drug possession, firearms 
charges (King1998), draft resistance, escaped slaves and prohibition enforcement (Ullman, 
2005). Miller (1991) notes the difficulty of alcohol enforcement, including winning convictions 
in southern jurisdictions during the decades following the Civil War. Okrent (2011) observes that 
during the prohibition era public resistance to alcohol laws was so strong that jury nullification 
for alcohol offenses was commonplace; he even refers to the public reaction to anti-alcohol laws 
as “social nullification”. This history of social acceptance of alcohol despite the law’s limitations 
is particularly relevant to this paper even though the data refer to a period of time decades after 
prohibition.   
Literature on Prosecutor Discretion 
Local jurisdictions’ prosecutors may also have their discretion influenced by their 
communities’ unfavorable view of particular laws. Prosecutors may refuse to seek charges 
against a defendant for a legitimate reason such as a belief that the evidence is too weak to win a 
conviction, or that police procedures were improper and may therefore result in an acquittal if the 
case were brought to trial. Problems resulting from pursuing criminal charges despite these 
problems are complicated by the double jeopardy protection; if the prosecutor tries to force a 
case through the court system despite evidentiary or procedural problems, the problem will never 
be eligible for a legal fix if the trial results in an acquittal. Therefore, prosecutor discretion is a 
necessary element of the criminal justice system, but like all forms of discretion, it presents the 
opportunity for abuse. Concerns occasionally arise that prosecutors decide to refuse to prosecute 
cases (a process referred to as nolle prosequi) based on extra-legal factors.   
In noting the contentious nature of this power, Adams and Cutshall (1987, p. 596) state, 
“Discretionary use of the (nolle prosequi) as a final case disposition can be controversial because 
this action precludes the possibility of conviction.”  Their research concluded that legal factors 
were the best predictors of nolle prosequi decisions, but that other factors also played a role in 
the handling of minor cases.  Nuebaur and Fradella (2011) explain the complex nature of 
prosecutorial discretion in terms of prosecutors’ legal judgments, their policy priorities and their 
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own standards of justice.  After reviewing the literature, they conclude similarly to Adams and 
Cutshall (1987) that in the realm of legal judgments, sufficiency and strength of evidence is the 
primary reason for prosecution. However, other reasons they cite are beneficial for understanding 
the current research. In the case of policy priorities, prosecutors may refuse to pursue criminal 
charges in cases with relatively minor charges or when the behavior is not a threat to the 
community. Given limited resources, prosecutors often pursue charges in the most serious cases 
thereby demonstrating their concerns for those cases at the expense of prosecuting less serious 
offenses. Neubauer and Fradella (2011) also note that personal standards of justice can influence 
whether a case is prosecuted. If the prosecutor does not believe the criminal behavior creates a 
threat to the community, regardless of the strength of the evidence, he or she may refuse to file 
charges. Therefore, prosecutors may not pursue criminal charges (nolle prosequi) after legitimate 
arrests due to concern that enforcing an unpopular law may have negative political ramifications.   
 The interview data provided in this research project indicate that charges in rural 
communities are often not filed or are dropped after they are filed.  Because prosecutors do not 
have to provide explanations for their refusal to file charges, it is difficult to conclude the reasons 
the cases referenced by this study’s informants were nolle prossed. However, as the interview 
data below demonstrate, the study participants attribute the reasons to prosecutors’ concerns 
about legal matters such as whether a conviction could be won, as well as extra-legal matters 
such as personal standards of justice in communities where moonshine involvement was fairly 
typical.    
Methods 
This research used qualitative interviews with participants who had previous involvement 
in the illegal liquor trade. This data collection method is appropriate for this research for a 
number of reasons. Because criminological research has not previously been done on moonshine 
violators, this research is exploratory.  Berg (2004) notes the utility of collecting qualitative data 
for exploratory research. Furthermore, the participants were older men who were comfortable 
carrying on conversations about their actions to an acquaintance, but would not take the time to 
answer a survey. They were willing to provide in-depth explanations during conversations, but 
would not take the time to write out their answers. Additionally, the qualitative interview 
allowed the researcher to ask follow up questions and seek clarification. This research method 
has been used to study a variety of sensitive topics including marijuana and other drug usage 
(Hallstone 2006), marijuana cultivation (Hammersvik, Sandberg and Pedersen 2012; Riggs, 
Hafley and Tewksbury 1996; Weisheit 1990),methamphetamine usage (Daniulaityte, Carlson 
and Kenne2007), pharmaceutical opioid abuse (Daniulaityte, Carlson and Kenne 2006), human 
sex trafficking (Troshynski and Blank 2008) and alcohol consumption among young American 
adults (Antin, Paschall and Nygaard 2010) and citizens of India (Gaunekar, et al. 2004). 
Additionally, previous research on moonshining has used the qualitative interview method (Peine 





and Schaft  2012; Wigginton 1971).  This history validates the utility of this method of data 
collection for this type of research. 
This research project’s sample was obtained through snowball sampling. It began with 
participants known to the researcher who had a history of involvement in making, drinking or 
trafficking in illegal liquor and grew as acquaintances gave the researcher access to other 
participants.  This sampling method is commonly used to access otherwise “impenetrable social 
groupings” (Atkinson and Flint 2001).  It has been used in researching sensitive issues involving 
prostitutes (McNamara 1994), drug users (Avico, et al 1998; Kaplan et al 1987), and pickpockets 
(Inciardi 1977). 
The sample includes violators as well as law enforcement officers. Additionally, the sample 
includes a participant who was a newspaper reporter for a paper in a rural community with a high 
amount of involvement in the alcohol trade. The interviews were designed as semi-formal 
interviews whereby the participants were asked a series of questions about the moonshine 
market, involvement and social dynamics surrounding the market. However, these questions 
were only used as a guide; the data gathered for this project were largely the result of an 
unforeseen consistency that emerged during the conversations with a number of participants. 
The sample is composed of nine participants who admit to a history of making, drinking 
and/or selling and transporting moonshine. All of these participants self-report their deviant 
behavior, but only in the past tense; they all stated that they had once been involved in the illicit 
alcohol industry, but had not been involved in it for several years. According to the dates they 
provided, this year range extends from the 1940s into the 1990s. 
The sample is also composed of six retired law enforcement officers who had experience 
enforcing laws pertinent to the moonshine industry. The majority of the officers were employed 
by agencies specifically geared toward the enforcement of alcohol laws such as the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms or state alcohol enforcement agencies. However, one of the 
retired law enforcement officer participants was a retired state trooper who primarily enforced 
traffic violations.  The majority of his career was spent working in a rural, Appalachian county 
where the moonshine market was quite active.  As a result, he was often involved in high-speed 
chases with bootleggers. Another retired law enforcement officer was a sheriff from a rural 
Appalachian county. One other officer retired from his job as a game warden for the state of 
Kentucky. In carrying out his official duties, he was often in the forests enforcing wildlife laws.  
However, this time in the woods often put him in contact with moonshiners or their still sites.  
Additionally, he grew up in the Appalachian mountains of Kentucky so he was familiar with the 
moonshine culture in the region. These officers primarily worked from the 1970s into the 1990s, 
however, some of them worked as far back as the 1950s. 
One other participant was a retired newspaper reporter who worked in a rural Appalachian 
community that had a high volume of illicit alcohol traffic. His involvement was as an observer 
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who neither enforced the law nor took part in the industry. During his career he had written a 
number of news stories about illicit alcohol cases. In carrying out this job, he had interviewed 
many moonshiners and bootleggers. He had also interviewed numerous law enforcement 
officials about illicit liquor violations. His data proved helpful because they provide community 
context from a neutral observer of the market. 
All of the participants were white males. Their ages ranged from the mid-50s to a 
participant who was in his 80s. Exact ages were not asked as part of the researcher’s effort to 
guarantee anonymity. The portion of the sample composed of moonshiners came from rural, 
Appalachian Mountain communities in North Carolina and Virginia. All of the law enforcement 
officers had worked most or all of their careers in Appalachian communities.   
The participants were guaranteed confidentiality, although some were guaranteed 
anonymity because the researcher was only given access to them through a trusted contact; this 
only happened with participants in the illicit alcohol production business. In those cases, the 
researcher was not given the names of the participants. The participants’ responses were written 
down at the time of the interviews and reviewed for clarification as soon after interview 
conclusions as possible. Most of the interviews were carried out at the residences of the 
participants, however, one moonshine producer was interviewed at a public location and two of 
the retired law enforcement officers were interviewed in a restaurant.    
Results from the Interview Data 
 The interviews provide clear-cut examples of jury nullification and nolle prosequi in 
moonshine cases. 
Jury Nullification 
The interview data point to the commonplace acceptance of moonshine in the participants’ 
jurisdictions. This explains why winning convictions for illicit alcohol violations was so 
challenging. One admitted user answered with the following quotation when asked about how 
concerned he was about law enforcement catching him with illicit liquor.   
“I’m pretty discreet about it.  I never bought in bulk.  I never bought enough to be 
concerned about it. I just don’t think a jury would be willing to put me away for buying a 
little at a time.”   
Another participant from another state provided this quote pointing to a belief based on 
previous knowledge that social acceptance would prevent some forms of moonshine production 
from resulting in convictions. 
“Some people just make it for themselves or for their family. They can’t convict you for 
that if you’re not selling it no matter what the law says. People around here just won’t 
allow it. The jury would let them walk just like lots of others already.” 





In the following statements, two retired BATF agents support this belief in explaining the 
frustrations of filing illicit alcohol violation cases in two Virginia counties. 
“It didn’t matter how strong the evidence was for cases in _____ county. They just weren’t 
going to convict.” 
“Everyone in that county was in it in some way. Some were making it, some were selling it 
and everyone was using it. They all had family members involved somehow.  So even if it 
wasn’t their family member for a case where they’re a juror, it was going to be a neighbor 
or something. So they just weren’t about to convict someone for a moonshine case.” 
Another law enforcement officer explained the frustration of seeing a defendant acquitted 
despite strong evidence.   
“The jury just thought I was an outsider. The evidence just didn’t matter. They saw me as 
an outsider from the city and if their neighbor said he didn’t do it, then he didn’t do it no 
matter how strong the case was.” 
“They saw me as an outsider and he was one of them. They just decided I was just making 
it all up I guess.” 
Another retired officer reiterated this frustration with illicit alcohol cases with the 
following quotes. 
“They just weren’t going to convict some of these guys. Some jurors had actually bought 
liquor from the defendant.  Of course, they knew he made it. They just weren’t going to 
convict their own friend.” 
“I had the guy dead to rights, but the jurors trusted their neighbors over me.” 
“They just didn’t believe me. Thought I was lying.” 
One officer interpreted the jurors’ actions by mimicking the jurors’ thought process. The 
following quotations are the officer’s sarcastic interpretation of the jurors’ opinions in multiple 
moonshine cases. 
 “These big city sons of bitches come in here trying to tell us our business.” 
 “They don’t know any better than us how to make a living.” 
Judging from the following quotes from one informant, one community’s propensity 
toward jury nullification extended to at least one grand jury. 
“The grand jury didn’t indict him…He had everything there at the still and was working it, 
but he didn’t have any liquor at the site…It hadn’t run yet…It sounds like the grand jury 
was just looking for a reason not to indict him.” 
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The refusal to indict even extended to a retired sheriff who would give small portions of the 
illicitly produced liquor to local residents who came seeking it to make home remedies. 
“We would give ‘em some if they came in the office and were sick or told us that one of 
their kin was sick. We didn’t give ‘em much, just enough to make syrup or an elixir.  But 
the state found out and tried to have me indicted more than once for trafficking in it, but the 
grand jury never would indict me...I ended up getting my picture in Time magazine about 
the whole thing.” 
It is important to note that many of these examples refer to different counties. This suggests 
that moonshine had a ubiquitous presence in many areas during the mid to late twentieth century 
and that those communities were largely tolerant of it.   
Nolle Prosequi  
Self-reported moonshiners provided the following quotations suggesting that nolle prosequi 
was also a common practice in their counties from the 1950s into the 1990s. It is evident that in 
some cases the respondents believed their local criminal justice systems were influenced by the 
commonplace involvement of much of the community in the illicit alcohol industry. In at least 
one event, a moonshine producer believed his case was not prosecuted because of a secondary 
connection to a judge. 
“Well, I knew that I’d been selling liquor to a man who was getting it for the judge.  So I 
figure (the prosecutor) knew that if he charged me, it wasn’t going to do him no good.  So, 
he just dropped the charges.” 
Another participant referred to a similar event. Because he did not refer to his subject by 
name, it is not known whether the following quotation refers to the previous quotations’ event. 
“There’s a guy who was making the judge’s whiskey when he got busted, but it ended up 
getting thrown out (of court). I don’t know why, but you can guess.”  
Other self-reported producers reported a lack of concern about suffering legal 
consequences for their action and attribute this attitude to community favorability to moonshine 
involvement. 
“I don’t worry about getting caught. Even if they catch me, they won’t be able to make it 
stick in court. There’s too much public against them…They aint gonna do nothing to 
(me).” 
“Well, everybody around here does it. Where they gonna find a jury that’ll convict me or 
anybody else? They’re better off just dropping the charges most of the time.” 
Retired BATF agents provided the following quotations which also to demonstrate 
prosecutors’ refusals to file charges against defendants of moonshine cases. 





“We finally just started going to federal court because going to state court would have been 
useless. The (prosecutor) just wouldn’t file the charges.” 
 
“I went to court lots of times and found the courtroom empty and the lights out…The 
prosecutor would just nolle prosequi the case and wouldn’t even bother to tell us.” 
“You weren’t going to get reelected in ____ county if you started prosecuting moonshiners.  
There were just too many people making money off it around there.” 
“It was so common down there that one time I found out that the sheriff’s office had run 
my tags after I had been on a stake out. (The moonshiners) spotted my car I guess and had 
connections with the sheriff’s office, so they ran it. After that, they stopped doing 
anything…When it’s that entrenched in a community, you’re just not going to be able to 
get a prosecutor to bring a lot of charges.” 
A retired sheriff felt that moonshine use and trafficking was so common in his jurisdiction 
that he eventually stopped putting serious enforcement efforts into it. 
“Everyone around here had just accepted it as a part of life. It was so hard to get 
convictions that we finally just started confiscating the liquor without charging them. We 
would still confiscate it, just not charge ‘em.” 
Another retired officer reiterated the belief that politics influenced the prosecution decision 
in another county where the moonshine industry was active. 
“If everyone in the county is drinking it or making it, then it’s part of the economy.  
Especially when there’s no other jobs around there. The (prosecutor) knows that and isn’t 
about to risk his job for something that is a part of their everyday life.” 
One resident who was a longtime witness to moonshine events in his county provided 
another example from one specific case in which a geriatric veteran had been raided at his still 
site. The language he uses provides examples of the reasons Neubauer and Fradella (2011) 
outline explaining why prosecutors often do not pursue charges. 
“I don’t think the prosecutor’s office is going to file the charges…The community is on 
(the defendant’s) side…An old guy like that, a veteran, and they raid him with their guns 
drawn. He’s an old man and he didn’t have a gun on him…The prosecutor has more 
important cases to worry about.” 
“The community’s pretty upset.” 
  




The informal controls in rural communities often conflict with the controls of the state.  
Sellin (1938) noted this in explaining his Culture Conflict theory of crime. It is clear from the 
study participants’ quotations that the rural communities where illicit alcohol was openly 
accepted had different definitions of acceptable behavior than the law had defined. Other 
interview data from the participants did not refer to the specific examples of jury nullification or 
nolle prosequi discussed here, but highlighted the belief that moonshine production and use was 
a ubiquitous part of life in those communities. For example, a retired alcohol enforcement officer 
told the researcher that confiscated alcohol was supposed to be destroyed within ten days of a 
conviction.  Instead many of the sheriffs gave it to the voters. On another occasion that same 
officer caught a previously convicted moonshiner giving a jar to illicit liquor to a sheriff. The 
commonplace use of moonshine in the districts discussed here support the assertion that 
communities, including locally elected officials of the criminal justice system, accepted its use as 
a norm. The retired game warden stated that it was a part of the community culture in many rural 
areas to the point that interference in it caused more problems for the communities than allowing 
it to continue undisturbed.   
The history of illicit alcohol production and its use in some rural areas of the United States 
suggests that the accepting culture is deeply ingrained and has not been deterred by long-
established laws.  In fact, national prohibition from the 1920s, nearly a century ago, may have 
reinforced many communities’ views about the acceptability of moonshine, thereby solidifying 
its folk crime status. As Ross (1960-1961, p. 237) suggests, social acceptance of folk crimes may 
occur when there is a “lack of congruence between the new laws and established mores.”  Social 
approval of the illicit alcohol industry likely increased because prohibition seems to have 
increased economic vitality in some rural communities with a pre-existing history and culture or 
moonshine production. The moonshine production skills became more profitable as a result of 
prohibition, which reinforced the communities’ positive views of the industry. Even after 
prohibition was repealed, the industry still thrived. One participant explained that national 
prohibition made only illegal liquor, which was primarily moonshine in some rural communities, 
available to drinkers. He stated, “They developed a taste for it.  When the government stuff came 
back, it was too late.  They already had the taste for moonshine”. Furthermore, after national 
prohibition was repealed, some states instituted state-level laws prohibiting alcohol. The same 
participant stated that the networks for trafficking in illegal liquor had already been put in place 
by national prohibition. It was then only a matter of delivering the illegal liquor to the residents 
in the states that were still dry. Therefore, the market for illegal liquor continued years after 
prohibition was repealed. 
This long history of social acceptance of moonshine made it more difficult to win 
convictions in these communities. The interviews delved into information that explains this but is 
illusive with other methods of data collection. For example, jury nullifications are not entered 
into official court records as such; they are only recorded as acquittals. The reasons for a jury to 





refuse to indict or convict a defendant do not have to be explained in any public forum. The same 
is somewhat true for prosecutor refusals to convict. Because prosecutors are given the discretion 
to determine which cases they believe merit legal pursuit, they make the decisions, but they do 
not have to enter their reasons into official court documentation. Therefore, the interviews 
discussed here provide insight into the participants’ views of these legal actions. Furthermore, 
the interviews demonstrate that law enforcement officers and offenders from moonshine friendly 
communities independently believe that social acceptance of illegal alcohol behavior influences 
a prosecutor’s ability to win a case in those jurisdictions.   
The concept of grand jury nullification among this sample is also noteworthy. Grand juries 
have the ability to decide whether enough evidence exists to charge a suspect; the trial jury 
makes decisions about guilt or innocence. The grand jury proceedings tend to favor prosecutors.  
Therefore, if a grand jury from a community is unwilling to even indict a suspect based on the 
evidence and proceedings that favor prosecutors, a conviction in a criminal trial is unlikely.  
Similar to jury nullifications from trial juries, there is no official reason provided in court 
paperwork to indicate why a grand jury declines to indict a suspect, so data such as this can 
provide insight into the motivations for those decisions. The data here suggest that communities 
accepting of involvement in the moonshine trade are willing to nullify the law even in 
proceedings prior to criminal trials. This unique type of jury nullification, particularly in rural 
areas where norm may conflict with official laws, merits further research.   
Conclusion 
Social approval of the illicit alcohol industry in some rural communities has existed for 
centuries. Miller (1991), points out that many isolated communities historically went to great 
efforts to protect, conceal or defend moonshiners from revenue agents. The history of 
moonshine, as well as the interview data provided here point to evidence of Sellin’s (1938) 
Culture Conflict theory in that some rural American subcultures have long been accepting and 
even expecting of behaviors that conflict with the larger culture’s laws dealing with moonshine.  
Furthermore, Ross’ (1960-1961) explanation of folk crime is used here to support this 
explanation by noting that there appears to be limited social condemnation or loss of social status 
associated with involvement in moonshine production and use in the communities discussed 
here.  The interview data also demonstrate that jury nullifications, by petit juries as well as grand 
juries, and nolle prosequi decisions appear to be manifestations of Culture Conflict and folk 
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